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Abstract. This paper suggests a new interpretation of the Dempster-
Shafer theory in terms of probabilistic interpretation of plausibility. A
new rule of combination of independent evidence is shown and its preser-
vation of interpretation is demonstrated. 1
1 Introduction
Dempster Rule of Independent Evidence Combination has been criticized for
its failure to conform to probabilistic interpretation ascribed to belief and plau-
sibility function. Among those verifying DST (Dempster-Shafer-Theory, [2,12])
critically were Kyburg [7], Fagin [3], Halpern [6], Pearl [9], Provan [10], Cano
[1], just to mention a few.
As a way out of those difficulties, we proposed in a recent book co-authored
by S.T.Wierzchon [18] three proposals for an empirical model of DST:
– ”the marginally correct approximation”.
– ”the qualitative model”
– ”the quantitative model”
The marginally correct approximation assumes that the belief function shall
constitute lower bounds for frequencies, though only for the marginals, and not
for the joint distribution. Then, the reasoning process is expressed in terms
of the so-called Cano et al. conditionals - a special class of conditional belief
functions that are positive. This approach implies modification of the reasoning
mechanism, because the correctness is maintained only by reasoning forward.
Depending on the reasoning direction we need different ”Markov trees” for the
reasoning engine.
Note that lower/upper bound interpretations have a long tradition for DST
[2,7] and have been heavily criticized [6]. The one that we presented in our
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book differs from the known ones significantly as we insist on different reason-
ing schemes (hypertrees) depending on which are our target variables, whose
values are to be inferred. This assures overcoming of the basic difficulties with
lower/upper bound interpretations.
Our qualitative approach is based on the earlier rough set interpretations of
DST, but makes a small and still significant distinction. All computations are
carried out in a strictly ”relational” way, that is, indistinguishable objects in a
database are merged (no object identities). The behavior under reasoning fits
strictly the DST reasoning model. Factors of well established hypergraph repre-
sentation (due to Shafer and Shenoy [14]) can be expressed by relational tables.
Conditional independence is well defined. However, there is no interpretation for
conditional belief functions in this model.
Rough set interpretations [15] were primarily developed for interpreting the
belief function in terms of decision tables. However, the Dempster-rule of evi-
dence combination was valid there only for the ”extended decision tables”, not
easily derived from the original ones. In our interpretation, both the original
tables and the resultant tables dealt with when simulating Dempster-rule are
conventional decision tables and the process of combining of decision tables is a
natural one (relational join operator).
Our rough set based interpretation may be directly applied in the domain of
multiple decision tables: independence of decision variables or Shenoy’s condi-
tional independence in the sense of DST may serve as an indication of possibility
of decomposition of the decision table into smaller but equivalent tables.
Furthermore, it may be applied in the area of Cooperative Query Answer-
ing [11]. The problem there is that a query posed to a local relational database
system may contain an unknown attribute. But, possibly, other co-operating
database systems know it and may explain it to the queried system in terms
of known attributes, shared by the various systems. The uncertainties studied
in the decision tables arise here in a natural way and our interpretation may
be used to measure these uncertainties in terms of DST (as a diversity of sup-
port). Furthermore, if several co-operating systems respond, then the queried
system may calculate the overall uncertainty measure using DST combination
of measures of individual responses.
The quantitative model assumed that the objects possess multivalued proper-
ties which are then lost in some physical properties and these physical processes
are described by DST belief functions (see e.g. [8])..
The quantitative model assumes that during the reasoning process one at-
taches labels to objects hiding some of their properties. There is a full agreement
with the reasoning mechanism of DST. Conditional independence and condi-
tional belief functions are well defined. We have also elaborated processes that
can give rise to well-controlled graphoidally structured belief functions. Thus,
sample generation for DST is possible. We elaborated also learning procedures
for discovery of graphoidal structures from data.
The quantitative model seems to be the best fitting model for belief functions
created so far.
This frequency model differs from what was previously considered [16,17] in
that it assumes that reasoning in DST is connected with updating of variables
for individual cases. This is different from e.g. reasoning in probability where rea-
soning means only selection of cases. In this way, failures of previous approaches
could be overcome.
Many authors [13,16] question the need for an empirical model for DST and
point rather to theoretical properties of DST considered within an axiomatic
framework seeking parallels with the probability theory. Though it is true that
the probability theory may be applied within the framework of Kolmogorov ax-
ioms and quite useful results are derived in this way, one shall still point out that
the applicability of probability theory is significantly connected with frequencies.
Both frequencies considered as ”naive probabilities”, ore ones being probabilities
”in the limit”. Statistics is clearly an important part of the probabilistic world.
All three interpretations share a common drawback they are not sensu stricto
probabilistic. In the current paper we make an attempt of a purely probabilistic
vision of plausibility function.
2 Basics of the Dempster-Shafer Theory
We understand DST measures in a standard way (see [12]). Let Ξ be a finite set
of elements called elementary events. Any subset of Ξ is a composite event, or
hypothesis. Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
Definition 1. [12] Let Ω be a finite set of elements called elementary events.
The set Ω is called frame of discernment. Any subset of Ω be a composite event.
A basic probability assignment (bpa) function is any function m:2Ω → [0, 1] such
that ∑
A∈2Ω
m(A) = ONE m(∅) = 0, ∀A∈2Ω 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
We say that a bpa is vacuous iff m(Ω) = ONE and m(A) = 0 for every A 6= Ω.
If ONE is equal 1, then we say that the belief function is normalized, otherwise
not (but ONE must be positive).
Definition 2. [12] Let a belief function be defined as Bel:2Ω → [0, 1] so that
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆Am(B). Let a plausibility function be Pl:2
Ω → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ω Pl(A) =
ONE − Bel(Ω − A), a commonality function be Q:2Ω − {∅} → [0, 1] with
∀A∈2Ω−{∅} Q(A) =
∑
A⊆Bm(B).
Definition 3. [12] The Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Func-
tions BelE1 , BelE2 Over the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-
Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
(c - constant normalizing the sum of m to 1).
Under multivariate settings Ξ is a set of vectors in n-dimensional space
spanned by the set of variables X={ X1, X2, . . .Xn}. If A ⊆ Ξ, then by projec-
tion A↓Y of the set A onto a subspace spanned by the set of variables Y ⊆ X we
understand the set B of vectors from A projected onto Y. Then marginalization
operator of DST is defined as follows:
m↓Y(B) =
∑
A;B=A↓X m(A).
Definition 4. (See [?]) Let B be a subset of Ξ, called evidence, mB be a basic
probability assignment such that mB(B) = 1 and mB(A) = 0 for any A different
from B. Then the conditional belief function Bel(.||B) representing the belief
function Bel conditioned on evidence B is defined as: Bel(.||B) = Bel ⊕BelB.
3 New Rule of Evidence Combination
Let us suggest now a totally new approach to understanding belief functions.
We assume the following interpretation of the plausibility function: Plξ(A) is
the maximum probability that an element from the set of events A occurs, given
the evidence ξ, where we assume the apriorical probability of all elementary
events is equal. Let ξ1 and ξ2 be two independent bodies of evidence, which are
represented numerically by plausibility functions Plξ1 and Plξ2 over some frame
of discourse Ω. We would like to obtain such an evidence updating rule ⊕Pl that
Pl3 = Plξ1 ⊕Pl Plξ2 would have the semantics that under that interpretation
Pl3(A) is the maximum probability that an element from the set of events A
occurs, given the evidence Pl1, Pl2 under the least conflicting evidence.
Let us study in detail this assumption. First of all we have to tell what we
mean by independent evidence. Let ω be an elementary event from the frame of
discernment Ω. The body of evidence ξ1 is independent of the body ξ2 if, for
each ω ∈ Ω, the probability of occurrence of evidence ξ1 is independent of the
occurrence of evidence ξ2. So we say that Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2|ω) = Pr(ξ1|ω) · Pr(ξ2|ω).
How shall we understand the evidence, however. For any A ⊆ Ω) should hold
Plξ(A) ≥ Pr(A|ξ). Consequently, by the way, Plξ(A) + Plξ(Ω/A) ≥ 1.
Now observe that Pr(ω1 ∨ ω2|ξ) = Pr(ω1|ξ) + Pr(ω2|ξ). As a consequence,
we have always that Plξ({ω1}) + Plξ({ω2}) ≥ Plξ({ω1, ω2}).
Let us now turn to combining independent evidence.
Pr(ω|ξ1 ∧ ξ2) = Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2|ω) ·
Pr(ω)
Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2)
Pr(ξ1|ω) · Pr(ξ2|ω) ·
Pr(ω)
Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2)
Pr(ω|ξ1) · Pr(ω|ξ2) ·
Pr(ξ1) · Pr(ξ2)
Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) · Pr(ω)
So we can conclude that Plξ1∧ξ2(ω) = Plξ1(ω)·Plξ2(ω)·c where c is a normalizing
factor (which needs to be chosen carefully).
But what about Pr(ω1 ∨ ω2|ξ1 ∧ ξ2) ? We know that Pr(ω1 ∨ ω2|ξ1 ∧ ξ2) =
Pr(ω1|ξ1 ∧ ξ2) + Pr(ω2|ξ1 ∧ ξ2) hence
Pr(ω1 ∨ ω2|ξ1 ∧ ξ2)
Pr(ω1|ξ1)·Pr(ω1|ξ2)·
Pr(ξ1) · Pr(ξ2)
Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) · Pr(ω1)
+Pr(ω2|ξ1)·Pr(ω2|ξ2)·
Pr(ξ1) · Pr(ξ2)
Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) · Pr(ω2)
As Pr(ω) is the same for all the ωs, we get
Pr(ω1 ∨ ω2|ξ1 ∧ ξ2)
(Pr(ω1|ξ1) · Pr(ω1|ξ2) + Pr(ω2|ξ1) · Pr(ω2|ξ2)) ·
Pr(ξ1) · Pr(ξ2)
Pr(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) · Pr(ω)
We can easily check that this translates to:
Plξ1∧ξ2({ω1, ω2}) =
max(Plξ1(ω1) ·Plξ2(ω1)+(Plξ1({ω1, ω2}−Plξ1(ω1)) ·(Plξ2({ω1, ω2}−Plξ2(ω1))
, P lξ1(ω1) · (Plξ2({ω1, ω2} − Plξ2(ω2)) + (Plξ1({ω1, ω2} − Plξ1(ω1)) · Plξ2(ω2)
, P lξ1(ω2) · (Plξ2({ω1, ω2} − Plξ2(ω1)) + (Plξ1({ω1, ω2} − Plξ1(ω2)) · Plξ2(ω1)
, P lξ1(ω2) ·Plξ2(ω2)+ (Plξ1({ω1, ω2}−Plξ1(ω2)) · (Plξ2({ω1, ω2}−Plξ2(ω2))) · c
where c is the normalizing factor mentioned earlier.
These formulas easily generalize for subsets of Ω with higher cardinality. The
normalizing factor should be chosen in such a way that Plξ1∧ξ2(Ω) = 1.
The generalization of ⊕Pl for frames of discourse with cardinality higher than
3 runs along the following lines. To combine Pl1 with Pl2 we calculate:
– for each subset X of Ω
Plresult(X) = PL
↓∗X
1 ⊗V Pl2↓ ∗X;
The operator ↓ ∗X does only a change of the domain of the Pl function
keeping the values of Pl for each subset of X and presuming that the discourse
frame consists only of X . In this way we get unnormalized Pls here, which are
not normalized during this operation.
The operator ⊗V , returning a numerical value, attempts identify such com-
binations of mass assignments ma and mb to singleton sets that will not violate
the constraints imposed by plausibility functions Pl1 and Pl2 resp. and such
that the sum
∑
X;Xasingletonma(X) ·mb(X) is maximal.
This is done by the operation of so-called pushing down the plausibilities
to singleton sets. Independently for Pl1 and Pl2 candidate ma and mb are ob-
taining via ”pushing-down” recursively a singleton ω of Ω. A candidate ma is
obtained if all singletons are pushed down. Different candidates are obtained
by different sequences of pushing down. It is easy to imagine that the process
is time-consuming and its complexity grows exponentially with the number of
elements of a set. Nonetheless for small domains the operation is feasible.
The idea of the push-down operator ↓ + is as follows: Let Pl be a plausibil-
ity function. If A does not contain ω, Pl↓+ω(A) = min(Pl(A), P l(A ∪ {ω}) −
Pl({ω})), and otherwise Pl↓+ω(A) = Pl(A).
Under these conditions it is obvious that we do not seek actually the max-
imum product over the whole domain, but rather in some ”corner points”. We
will give a formal proof elsewhere that this check is in fact sufficient to establish
the maximum. Here we only want to draw attention to the analogy with linear
programming, where we seek the maximum subject to linear constraints. When-
ever we fix ”pushdown” of one of the plausibility distributions, we in fact have
a linear optimization case with the other. If found, we can do the same with the
other.
The ⊕Pl operator is characterized by commutativity and associativity. The
commutativity is easily seen because all the operations are in fact symmetrical
with respect to left and right hand of the operators. The associativity is more
difficult to grasp, and a formal proof will be subject of another publication.
Nonetheless we can give here brief common-sense guidelines how it can be es-
tablished. We can essentially concentrate on the associative properties of the
maximum operator. Starting with the expression of combination of all the three
plausibility functions, we can show that we can equivalently denote the same
optimization task when drawing behind braces the first or the third operand.
In the next section we show some properties of the new operator compared
with Dempster rule of combination for some illustrative examples.
4 Examples
Let us consider the bodies of evidence in the tables 1, 2, 3.
Table 1. mass function for the body of evidence ξa
m value for the set of elements
0.0 { }
0.25 { red }
0.25 { blue }
0.25 { red , blue }
0.25 { green }
0.0 { red , green }
0.0 { blue , green }
0.0 { red , blue , green }
We can check the commutativity and obtain the results as in the table 4.
The associativity has been verified in table 5.
It is worth noting, that the new operator is different from Dempster rule,
compare tables 4 and 6
Table 2. mass function for the body of evidence ξb
m value for the set of elements
0.0 { }
0.2 { red }
0.4 { blue }
0.1 { red , blue }
0.0 { green }
0.0 { red , green }
0.3 { blue , green }
0.0 { red , blue , green }
Table 3. mass function for the body of evidence ξc
m value for the set of elements
0.0 { }
0.0 { red }
0.15 { blue }
0.25 { red , blue }
0.35 { green }
0.25 { red , green }
0.0 { blue , green }
0.0 { red , blue , green }
Table 4. mass function for the body of evidence (ξa⊕PL ξb) =(ξb⊕PL ξa)
m value for the set of elements
0.0 { }
0.11111111111111105 { red }
0.4999999999999999 { blue }
0.22222222222222232 { red , blue }
0.0 { green }
0.0 { red , green }
0.16666666666666674 { blue , green }
0.0 { red , blue , green }
Table 5. mass function for the body of evidence ((ξa⊕PLξb)⊕PLξc) =(ξa⊕PL(ξb⊕PL
ξc))
m value for the set of elements
0.0 { }
0.0 { red }
0.4214285714285715 { blue }
0.3214285714285714 { red , blue }
0.014285714285714124 { green }
0.07142857142857151 { red , green }
0.1357142857142858 { blue , green }
0.0357142857142857 { red , blue , green }
Table 6. mass function for the body of evidence (ξa⊕ ξb)
m value for the set of elements
0.0 { }
0.20833333333333337 { red }
0.6249999999999999 { blue }
0.04166666666666663 { red , blue }
0.12500000000000003 { green }
0 { red , green }
0 { blue , green }
0 { red , blue , green }
With this and other experiments we see clearly the tendency of Dempster
rule to move mass downwards to singleton sets, whereas the new rule is much
more cautious here and in fact does not introduce the feeling of certainty where
it is not justified.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced in this paper a new DST operator for combining independent
evidence providing a clear probabilistic definition of the plausibility function,
which is preserved under this rule of combination.
We have also provided several toy examples to give an impression what results
are returned by the new operator.
Though the strict theoretical proof of properties like cummutativeness, asso-
ciativeness is still to be provided, the computations for test examples show that
the properties really hold. It is also obvious from the examples that the new rule
differs from the Dempster rule of evidence combination. An interested reader is
invited to visit the Web page
http://www.ipipan.waw.pl/˜klopotek/DSTnew/DSTdemo.html to try out him-
self.
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